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"THE FABLED ESOP"
ROBERT

S. TArT

Most persons are familiar with Aesop's Fables. On the other hand,
not many tax practitioners know the value of the fabled ESOP. ESOP
stands for Employees Stock Ownership Plan. It is also called ESOT,
or Employee Stock Ownership Trust. This type of employee benefit
is by no means the dreamchild of tax-conscious lawyers. As far back
as 1926 the Sun Oil Company established a stock bonus plan for its
own employees and those of its numerous subsidiaries. Similarly, other
companies have established and maintained for as long as forty and
fifty years employee stock bonus programs. The purpose of such
a plan is to give employees a stake in the company through stock
ownership. ESOPs or ESOTs resemble profit-sharing plans in that
deductions are limited to 15% of payroll; distributions may be
paid other than at retirement or other termination of employment;
allocation of contributions is made according to compensation of participants; forfeitures are reallocated to participants; and contributions
may be at the discretion of the employer. The contributions of the
employer can, but do not have to be related to profits. Benefits are
distributed in the form of company stock.
With the introduction of special tax treatment for the "Qualified
Benefit Plan" under the Internal Revenue Code, this type of employee
plan took on a new and additional meaning. Employees and employers became eligible for tax-favored treatment under the aegis of the
qualified plan.
Regulation 1.401-1(b)(1)(iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 provides a definition as follows: "A stock bonus plan is a plan
established and maintained by an employer to provide benefits similar
to those of a profit-sharing plan, except that the contributions by the
employer are not necessarily dependent upon profits and the benefits
are distributable in stock of the employer company. For the purpose
of allocating and distributing the stock of the employer which is to
be shared among his employees or their beneficiaries, such a plan is
subject to the same requirements as a profit-sharing plan."
Thus, we see that Congress specifically related the employee stock
ownership plan to the employee profitsharing plan. Nevertheless, it
was the pension plan and the profit-sharing plan that received most if
not all of the attention of tax planners in the last thirty years. In fact,
after the 1954 Code was enacted, many Revenue Rulings were issued
to clarify points with respect to pension and profit-sharing plans. The
first reference to an employee stock ownership plan did not appear
in the Revenue Rulings until late in 1956 when Revenue Rule 56-656,
relating to a profit-sharing plan, stated in its last sentence that "it is also
held that the above principles are equally applicable to employees
pension or stock bonus plan." In an economy which has seen a
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substantially declining stock market, and reduced company profits, profitsharing plans have been in declining favor. Similarly, with the advent
of ERISA, and its stringent requirements, pension plans have become
apparently less attractive. Accordingly, all paths now lead to the
Employees Stock Ownership Plan. This type of plan offers a wealth
of benefits for both employers and employees. In the first instance,
a qualified stock bonus plan offers more flexibility than either the
pension or profit-sharing plans. This is true both as to contributions
and investment of funds. Unlike both the pension and profit-sharing
plans, which severely limit plan fund investment in employer-connected
assets, the very basis of the stock bonus plan is investment in employer
stock. It provides the most direct incentive to employees as they are
given a participation in the equity of the employer. It also provides
a market for company stock. For example, when a. stockholder of a
closely-held corporation dies, it is usually difficult to market his
stock. The stock is counted in his estate for estate tax purposes and,
without a market for said stock, leaves the estate without the liquidity
to pay the taxes on the estate. A stock bonus or profit-sharing trust
operating under a unilateral stock selling agreement on the part of
stockholders and a unilateral stock purchase option held by the
Trustee could well provide a market for the stock, provided the terms
of the arrangement are entirely favorable to the Trust.
A third type of benefit for the employer is that should the employer
be strapped for cash, he can contribute stock to the plan. The value
of the stock is deductible, which should free up tax dollars for him
for purposes other than employee fringes. It is important to note
that the employer's contribution does not have to be in stock; the
employer can contribute cash with which stock is purchased from
different sources. This will be further expanded upon infra.
ERISA is primarily dedicated to the improvement of pension plans
from an employee security program. Only some of its provisions are
relevant to employee stock ownership plans. Such references are made
under the umbrella of the reference in ERISA to "qualified plans."
For example, under ERISA, a plan will not qualify for exemption if it
requires, as a condition to plan participation, that an employee have
a period of service with the employer which extends beyond (a) one
year of service or (b) the date which the employee reaches age twentyfive, whichever occurs later. However, a plan which provides for 100%
vesting after three years of service can defer participation until an
employee has put in three years of service. A "year of service" is now
defined to mean a twelve-month period during which the employee has
not less than 1,000 hours of service. Computation of any twelve-month
period shall be made the reference to the date on which the employee's
employment commenced, except that, under Regulations subscribed
to by the Secretary of Labor, such computation may be made by reference to the first day of a plan year in the case of an employee who
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did not complete 1,000 hours of service during the twelve-month period
beginning on the date his employment commenced. A key advantage
to employers under ERISA is found in Section 410(b) (2) of the
Code which permits there to be excluded from consideration of
minimum participation standards for qualification, employees not included in the plan who are included in a unit of employees covered
by an agreement which the Secretary of Labor finds to be collective
bargaining agreement between employee representatives and one or
more employers, if there is evidence that retirement benefits were the
subject of good faith bargaining between such employee representatives
and such employer or employers.
ERISA provides a new tax treatment for lump-sum distributions from
all qualified plans. Accumulations attributable to years of participation
before 1974 will be all capital gain and accumulations attributable to
years of participation after 1973 will be all ordinary income. However,
there is now a special elective ten-year forward averaging rule and
a $10,000 minimum distribution allowance for taxing the ordinary income portion of the distribution. The minimum distribution allowance
is computed as follows: there is an exclusion of 50% of the first
$20,000 of a distribution, reduced, however, by 20% of the amount by
which the distribution exceeds $20,000. To compute the ten-year forwarding average, the entire distribution which is subject to tax (including 100% of any capital gain) is divided by 10; a tax on this amount
is computed by using the rates for single taxpayers and this tax is
multiplied by 10. Finally, this result is multiplied by the percentage of
the taxpayer's plan participation after 1973.
If an employer receives more than one lump-sum distribution in
one tax year, the new law applies a special "look back" provision. All
lump-sum distributions received in the current year and during the
five years preceding the year of the current distribution are included
for purposes of computing the tax under the ten-year rule. The tax
on the prior distribution is then subtracted from the tax thus computed
to find the tax on the current distribution. The net result, of course,
is a higher tax under the ten-year rule on the ordinary income element
of the current distribution. The look back rules do not apply to lumpsum distributions made prior to 1974.
Finally, if none of the above rules are applicable to a particular taxpayer's distribution, he can always fall back upon the regular fiveyear income averaging. As can be seen by the above, the new rules
are quite complicated. The big exception to these rules apply to
stock payouts. When the employee receives a lump-sum distribution of
stock following his termination of employment, he is taxed only on
the value of stock equal to the employer's original contributions-even
if the stock is worth much more. Furthermore, the amount he is
taxed upon is taxed on the same favorable basis as lump-sum distributions from other qualified plans. The unrealized appreciation is not

TAX CONFERENCE

taxed until sale of the stock. If stock is then held by the employee for
at least six (6) months, gain upon sale are taxed at long-term capital gain
rates.
In order to qualify, a plan must benefit either (a) 70% or more of all
employees, or 80% of all eligible employees, if at least 70% of all employees are eligible to benefit under the plan, or (b) such employees
as qualify under a classification which does not discriminate in favor
of officers, shareholders, or highly compensated employees.
There are now minimum vesting standards required (found in Code
Sec. 411) which provide that there will be complete vesting of a
normal retirement. benefit on attaining normal retirement age, complete
vesting of all accrued benefits derived from an employee's own contributions to a qualified plan, and complete vesting of all accrued benefits derived from the employer's contributions under one of the
following three alternatives: (a) full vesting on a prescribed graduated
basis after fifteen years of service; (b) full vesting after ten years of
service, or (c) full vesting under the so-called "Rule of 45", which
is that an employee with at least five years of service must have a
non-forfeitable right to at least 50% of his accrued benefit derived
from his employer's contributions when the sum of his age and the
number of years of service totals 45. For each succeeding year of
service required, the percentage goes up ten points so that, after an
additional five years of service, the employee has 100% vested interest
in his accrued benefit.
It becomes obvious that in considering the establishing of an employees stock ownership plan, the attorney first must consider the
requirements of Code Secs. 401 through 415. Having become an expert
in the meaning of these Sections, including the Regulations thereunder
which should be forthcoming in the near future, the attorney will take
the next step, which is consideration of the more sophisticated aspects
of employees' stock ownership plans. The first benefit is the taxfavored financing for a corporation. The typical situation would involve a closely-held company in need of financing. It would establish
an ESOP for the benefit of its employees. The ESOP Trustees would
apply to a financial institution for a loan, to be guaranteed by the
employer. Then the ESOP Trustees would purchase from the employer stock of the employer (possibly created just for that purpose)
and these shares of stock would form the trust res for the benefit of
employees.
Thereafter, the employer would make its contributions to the stock
ownership plan every year in cash, said contributions being fully deductible, and the Trustees of the plan would use the contributions to
repay the bank under its loan agreement, including interest payments
and amortization of the loan itself. In this manner, the employer is
able to complete a financing arrangement and obtain a deduction for
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paying off the loans thereunder. The employees benefit by having a
stock interest in the employer and everybody is happy.
An alternative situation would arise where in a closely-held corporation, the shareholders are anxious to realize cash from the corporation
in other than dividend form. They cannot unreasonably increase their
compensation or the corporation will have a dividend treatment attributed to the portion of compensation deemed unreasonable by Internal
Revenue. There is no market for the corporation's stock. Thus, the
shareholders look to the creation of an ESOP whereunder, the corporation will contribute cash to the ESOP and receive a deduction therefor,
and the ESOP will purchase stock in the corporation from the shareholders themselves. This would be a capital gains transaction for
the shareholders. This could be accomplished in one year or over a
period of years.
Finally, from the employee's point of view, should the employee
receive a distribution from the ESOP of the employer's stock and die
with said stock, his estate would pay no income taxes whatsoever and
arguably receive a stepped-up basis in the stock for future sales
purposes.
In addition, ESOPs may include life insurance benefits if incidental
to the primary purpose of the plan. This can include keyman insurance
and stock purchase insurance on the life or lives of current stockholders.
Just recently Congress "iced the cake" by offering a 1%investment
credit to corporate taxpayers which contribute an amount equal to 1%
of the qualified investment to an employee stock ownership plan. This
is found in Sec. 301 (d) of the Tax Reduction Act of 1975.
In order to take advantage of the investment credit under the Tax
Reduction Act of 1975, shares must be allocated to employees who
participated at some time during the plan year even if they were not
participants on the last day of the plan year; contributions to the
ESOP may not be integrated with social security benefits; only the
first $100,000 of compensation may be taken into account; immediate
full vesting is required; participants must be entitled to vote the shares
allocated to the respective accounts; and only common stocks or
securities convertible to common stock may be contributed.
Because of these restrictions, it may be worthwhile to consider establishing a separate one time ESOP for this additional investment credit
benefit.
Recently, the Employees Stock Ownership Plan concept was used
in an unusual financing whereunder a private company was "taken
public". Amsted Industries, Inc. had been seeking to divest itself of
its South Bend Lathe Company unit and had not met with much success. A logical alternative was to merely close down the unit. Rather
than do so, Amsted used the ESOP to solve its problem. It established a
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South Bend Lathe ESOP, which borrowed $10 million, $5 million
from the Federal Economic Development Administration to the City
of South Bend and $5 million from two Indiana banks and Heller
International, Inc. The ESOP then purchased all of the stock of the
South Bend Company, which company will remain intact and business
operations will be unaffected. Ultimately, the South Bend unit itself will
make enough contributions to the ESOP in cash to pay off the loans
and the employees will, in the end, own the stock of the South Bend
unit.
The Internal Revenue Service has considered the distribution of stock
from an ESOP to employees, with respect to tax consequences. It has
long been believed by many tax practitioners that should an employee
receive stock with unrealized appreciation from an ESOP, and should
the employee die and that stock become part of the employee's estate,
the beneficiary receiving the stock would also receive a stepped-up
basis in the stock, being the fair market value on the valuation date
of the stock in the estate. Now the Internal Revenue Service, in Revenue Ruling 75-125 has stated that it does not go along with this
theory. Rather, it takes the position that the unrealized appreciation,
which was not taxed when the stock was distributed from the ESOP
to the employee, is income in respect of the decedent in the abovementioned situation. The Ruling gives an example whereunder an employee retires in 1969, receives employer securities from a qualified
plan with a basis of 5x (lx of employee contributions + 4x of employer contributions) and with a fair market value of 10x. At that
point, the employee would have to pay tax on 4x (the employer
contribution). The employee then dies in June of 1974 leaving the
aforementioned securities to his wife. At the date of death, the fair
market value of the securities is 12x. The securities are sold three
months later for 13x.
The wife's basis in the securities is the fair market value at date of
death minus the unrealized appreciation. This works out to be 12x
minus 5x equals 7x. The 5x, which is the unrealized appreciation, is
income in respect of a decedent under Section 691(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.
The tax treatment of the above transaction would be as follows:
the amount realized from the sale is 13x; from this we subtract the
wife's basis as computed under Section 1014(a) of the Code, which
is 7x, arriving at a taxable gain of 6x. This gain is further broken down
into gain attributable to unrealized appreciation of 5x and the excess
gain over the unrealized appreciation of lx. The 5x is -long-term
capital gain since the gain retains the same character as it would have
in the hands of the decedent had he lived. Due to the operation of
Section 1223(11) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended,
the gain of lx gets long-term capital gain treatment even though the
wife held the securities for only three months. Section 1223(11) states
that in case of a person acquiring property from a decedent dying
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after December 31, 1970, if basis is determined under Section 1014(b)
of the Code and the property is sold within six months, then the
property is to be considered as being held for more than six months.
Under the normal rules with respect to the excess appreciation, the
property must be held for at least six months to receive long term
capital gain treatment.
Furthermore, a deduction is allowed to the wife under Section 691(c)
for the portion of Federal Estate Tax attributable to the amount of net
unrealized appreciation included in the decedent's estate, even if
none of the unrealized appreciation is included in the decedent's estate
because of Section 2039(c) of the Code. It may be noted that if the
stock went from the Trust directly to the wife after the death of the
employee, Section 1223(11) would not appear to apply since the
property would not have "passed from the decedent" within the meaning of Section 1014(b). Thus, the holding period of the wife would be
the key to the tax treatment of the lx.
Revenue Rule 75-125 is very important when doing estate planning
with respect to death benefits received from a qualified plan. On top
of the adverse implications of this Ruling, proposed Regulation
1.402(e)-2(d) (2) (iii) states that a distribution made to more than one
person (except a payment made solely to two or more Trusts) is not
treated as a lump sum distribution. Therefore, should a death benefit
under a qualified plan be left to a wife and should she predecease her
husband, to their children in equal shares, and should this benefit
devolve down to the children, they would lose the capital gain treatment. An obvious way to avoid this is to set up Trusts for the children,
but this is cumbersome and they have other adverse tax consequences.
Another problem area in connection with ESOPs made itself known
in the Aero Rental v. Commissioner decision, 64TC33 (5/29/75). In
this case, it was determined that while a requirement that the participants sell their shares to the Company (or the Company have a call
on the shares) upon distribution by an ESOP would not be acceptable
to the Internal Revenue Service, a provision that the Company has
a right of first refusal and/or that the employees may put the shares
to the Corporation will be acceptable. This case clearly points out that
the employer may not keep control over its stock once the stock is
distributed by the ESOP to the employees.
It would seem that as tax planners and the Internal Revenue Service
become more aware of the facts of ESOPs, there will be additional
restrictions and limitations in connection therewith. Accordingly, it
is recommended that serious consideration be given to all facets of
utilizing an ESOP before one recommends it or uses it.
There are many non-tax aspects involved with respect to the ESOP.
These go right to the basic question of whether a corporation can
even legally establish an ESOP. Under the holding of Murrell v. ElderBeerman Stores Corp., 239 NE 2d 248 (1968), the general rule has
been reaffirmed that even though a corporation may not be expressly
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authorized to adopt and pay employee benefits, such authority is said
to reside in the implied powers of the corporation. Most certainly a
statute, charter or by-laws could prohibit a corporation from undertaking such a project, or provide that consent of the stockholders must
be obtained before putting a Plan into effect. Therefore, the first
place one must look in considering an ESOP is to the state statutes.
There are practically no statutes on the books in the fifty states dealing
with the right of a corporation to establish a fringe benefit program
such as an ESOP for employees. There are numerous cases in the
various states, all of which affirm the general right of a corporation
to so provide benefits for its employees. In fact, in Holmes v. Republic
Steel Corporation, 84 NE 2d 508 (1948), the Court stated that "a
corporation would be short-sighted which sought to make its laborers
kmd clerks satisfied and happy employees, and neglected its key men
and executives." This was dealing with the power of a corporation
to allow its executives to participate in a Pension Plan.
The next step is to review the corporate charter and by-laws. Most
corporate charters merely contain a specific power of the corporation
to enact the particular business that it is in and then add general
powers to enact all other legal business that a corporation can enact.
This would fit in with the general principles just discussed.
The by-laws of the corporation, which are really the operating
tools, must be reviewed to see if they specify whether or not Directors
alone can enact an ESOP and whether or not Directors alone have the
right to make the ESOP allocations and valuations, and how minority
stockholders' rights are affected. If the by-laws are silent, it would be
wise to amend the by-laws (and this may require stockholder approval)
to lay down ground rules for the establishment and operation of an
ESOP.
Generally, the state statutes entrust the total business management
of a corporation to the Board of Directors. Stockholders rarely, if
ever, participate directly in the management of the business. Thus, the
establishment of an employees' benefit program would seem to be
solely within the authority of the Board of Directors as one of its
implied powers. Nevertheless, as a relatively conservative attorney, it
would be my recommendation that stockholder approval be sought
before an ESOP is established. This may be accomplished by proposing
a plan for stockholder approval, by adopting a plan conditioned upon
subsequent approval of stockholders, by adopting a plan and seeking
subsequent ratification and approval of the Board's action by the
stockholders, or by proposing an amendment to the by-laws which
would authorize the Directors to establish such a plan. The obtaining
of approval of stockholders would most certainly lessen the force of
any minority objections.
Some states, such as New Jersey, require stockholder approval in
certain circumstances. New Jersey requires approval only when the
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plan permits the use or issuance of Treasury shares or authorized but
unissued shares. In all other cases, the Board of Directors alone can
adopt a plan by majority vote if the Certificate of Incorporation or bylaws do not provide otherwise. This is found in Section 14A:8-2 of
the New Jersey Business Corporation Law.
The adoption procedures are relatively simple. The first step is for
the Directors to decide upon the plan they want the corporation to
install. After all the details have been worked out and the plan formulated, the Directors formally adopt a resolution approving the plan.
The resolution may state that ratification is required or shareholder
approval is required. Such approval may be accomplished at the Annual
Stockholders' Meeting or at a special meeting called for this purpose.
Minority stockholders have not been successful in limiting the
establishment of such a plan. The general rule is that an employee
benefit plan may be established over the objections of minority stockholders if the payments bear some relationship to the value of services
rendered by the employees. There have been some cases such as
Moore v. Keystone Macaroni Company, 87A2d 295 (1952), wherein
minority stockholders have been successful in defeating fringe benefit
payments where the Court failed to find a relationship between the
payments and the value of services rendered. It might be noted that
in that case there was no stockholder approval called for by the Board,
but merely Board action. The area where minority stockholders have
been most successful in preventing the payment of employee fringe
benefits is when the benefits are related or measured by past services.
Here, case law in the particular state involved should be studied.
The next area to consider is the rights of the employer's creditors.
Where the employer has no control over the funds of an irrevocable
qualified plan which has been created in good faith, it does not seem
that the employer's creditors can reach amounts paid into the Trust
prior to the employer's insolvency. Trust Law would seem to indicate
that monies irrevocably contributed to a Trust Fund for the exclusive benefit of employees and their beneficiaries are no longer assets
of the employer and, as such, not subject to creditors' claims. It might
be noted that a question can arise when an employer has determined
that a contribution to an ESOP should be made for a given year and
then the employer goes into bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Act provides
in Section 64 that "wages due the workmen" shall "have priority in
advance of the payment of dividends to creditors, and are to be paid
in full out of bankrupt estates." The Supreme Court of the United
States, in a split decision has indicated that plan contributions are not
"wages due the workmen". (United States v. Embassy Restaurant,Inc.,
359 US 29 (1959)).
A number of states have passed statutes which specifically grant preferred status to claims of employee benefit plans. For example, in
Michigan, employer obligations to pension, profit-sharing, health or
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welfare plans for the benefit of non-salaried employees are preferred
claims when an employer's business is suspended by action of creditors
or is placed in the custody of a Receiver or Trustee. The law is similar
in Illinois. On the other hand, a New York Court has refused to order
a Receiver in foreclosure of real property to pay accumulated unpaid
contributions due a Union Pension and Welfare Fund under a collective
bargaining agreement between the Union and prior owners of the
property. The Receiver need only pay contributions due from the date
of his appointment (Bradford Financial Corp. v. Clark West Realty
Corp., 252 NYS 2d 580 (1964)).
All states permit the establishment of a Qualified Trust. In addition,
the general rule is that the Qualified Trust is not subject to the rule
against perpetuities. This rule requires that all future interests vest
within a period measured by a life or lives of persons in existence
at the start of the Trust plus twenty-one years thereafter, and gestation
periods. Most States specifically exempt trusts set up as part of a stock
bonus, pension, profit-sharing, disability, or death benefit plan from the
ordinary requirements as to duration of trusts and accumulation of
income. In New York this exemption is found in the Personal Property
Law, Section-C.
It might also be worthwhile to mention that many states have their
own laws dealing with fringe benefits and qualified plans. Therefore,
compliance is required not only of ERISA but of the particular requirements of the various states. For example, in Michigan, under Public
Act 45, Laws of 1966, an employer who fails to make promised payments to an employee benefit plan within three weeks after they
become due and payable is guilty of a misdemeanor. In Missouri, the
employer has sixty days to make payment before he goes up for a
misdemeanor. In New Jersey, the period of payment is thirty days
after they are due and an employer who knowingly and wilfully fails
or refuses to make such payments is a disorderly person, and upon
conviction, is punishable by a fine up to $500.00 or imprisonment up
to one year, or both. The states also have rules on vesting, on filings and
reporting, as well as other aspects of employee fringe benefits. Thus
it becomes absolutely essential for the Board of Directors of a corporation to be given the full specifics of state law relating to the ESOP
as well as the Federal rules.
That brings us to the question of regulation for purposes of Securities' Acts. The Securities Act of 1933 requires securities issuers to make
full and fair disclosure of information about their securities to their
prospective purchasers. This is accomplished in two ways: (1) by requiring the filing of a Registration Statement with the SEC disclosing
details deemed necessary to enable the buying public to form an
accurate judgment of the value of the security offered, and (2) by
requiring the use of a prospectus containing information similar to that
required in the Registration Statement but in a condensed form.
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Jurisdiction over pension and profit-sharing plans arise from the
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, which require registration with
the SEC in the event of a public sale of, or offer to sell, a "security".
The term "security" is defined by Section (21) of the Act to include
"certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement,
... or investment contract, . . . or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate for, receipt
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to, or purchase,
any of the foregoing."
For years this gave the SEC the right in its own opinion to look
into Qualified Plans with respect to security sales. However, the
Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970 added the following
to the classes of securities that are exempt from registration under
Section 3(a)2 of the Securities Act: Any interest or participation in
a single or collective Trust Fund that is issued in connection with (1)
a qualified stock bonus, pension or profit-sharing plan or (2) an annuity
plan which meets the requirements for the deduction of employer's
contributions (under Internal Revenue Code Section 404(a) (2)).
Thus, at present, registration is only required in two cases: (1) when
an amount in excess of employer's contribution is allocated to the
purchase of securities issued by the employer or by any company
directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by or under common
control with the employer. (2) When a plan covers self-employed
individuals and owner employees within the meaning of Internal Revenue Code Section 401(c)(1). However, the SEC may exempt selfemployed plans (if and to the extent that the Commission determines
this to be necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors...).
There are also certain private letter rulings in the field that indicate that ESOPs are not required to register with the SEC. Should the
SEC ever determine that a particular ESOP is being used for a financing vehicle that should require public disclosure, such as "going private"
or "going public", then and in such event in order to seek exclusion
from registration the company must look to the regular exemption
from registration requirements under the SEC rules. The courts have
gone along with this. For example, in SEC v. Ralston Purina Company,
346 U.S. 119 (1953) the Supreme Court ruled that even though an
offering of securities is limited to employees of the company, if all
employees offered the stock do not have access to the same information that would be disclosed in registration, the offering is public.
The 1970 Act would imply that contributory ESOPs must be registered unless exempt under the normal exemption for registration rules.
In that case a Form S-8 may be required.
It is worthwhile to mention that even if a securities issue is exempted
because it is a qualified ESOP, these exempted securities are still subject
to the anti-fraud provisions of the securities act.
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Most states have "blue sky" laws, which have been enacted to prevent the fraudulent sale of securities in the particular state. Definitions
under most of the statutes are so broad that pension, profit-sharing
and stock bonus plans may be readily held to fall under the requirements of registration. Many states exempt qualified plans from blue sky
registration. For example, the New York law provides that "the
Attorney-General may upon application, in writing, grant exemptions
. . . to any person, partnership, corporation, company, trust or association which is a dealer . . . , solely by reason of the fact that it

is offering to sell or selling or offering to purchase or purchasing to
or from the public, within or from the state . . . securities issued in

connection with an employees' stock purchase, savings, pension, profitsharing, or similar benefit plan." (New York General Business Law,
Section 359-F(2)(e)). The caveat here is to know your state law and
be aware that it exists.
There are also the miscellaneous state laws that relate to ESOPs. State
laws relating to contracts, etc. must be studied when formulating your
ESOP concepts. You cannot overlook them as they most certainly
may have bearing. For example, under the laws of many states it is
possible to protect the benefits payable to employees from claims of
their creditors by inserting appropriate language in the trust instrument. In other states, this type of spendthrift clause does not work.
States with such spendthrift statutes include Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
Texas and Wisconsin.
In addition, every state has special laws dealing with minors and
their right to enter into legally enforceable contracts, which generally
allow a minor to disaffirm the contract upon attaining maturity. These
laws must be checked when an employer establishes a contributory
employee benefit plan, as well as for the implications of a minor
being a secondary beneficiary under a plan.
The final thought with respect to the state law implications of an
ESOP goes to the capitalization of the corporation. Before structuring
an ESOP, the corporate capitalization must be reviewed, first and most
importantly to make sure there is stock available for the ESOP, and
secondly to consider on a long-range basis just how much control
should ultimately be taken out of the hands of the majority stockholders
by the ESOP, whether the stock going to the ESOP should be voting
stock, or a type of special stock, and in general all of the other implications of corporate capitalization should be reviewed.
The next area under discussion is the plan administration, and more
particularly fiduciary responsibility. One of the most important aspects
of ERISA is its fiduciary responsibility requirements. Both corporate
and individual trustees may be subject to the same duties and obligations
prescribed by trust instruments. Therefore they are governed by the
same general principles of trust law. The laws of the various states
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as to trust investments and behaviour are not uniform. A trustee must
look to the laws of his own state for guidance. In addition, the trustee
must be iware of the overriding Federal rules of ERISA.
The New York rule, broadly stated is that the trustee is given power
"4to invest in such securities as would be acquired by prudent men of
discretion and intelligence in such matters who are seeking a reasonable
income and the preservation of their capital". This is found in EPTL
Section 11-2.2(a)(1). ERISA also seems to adopt the "prudent man
rule".
Part XVI of ERISA contains the fiduciary responsibilities and prohibitive transaction section. It directs that each plan must be in trust
form and must specifically name the fiduciary or fiduciaries who wiln
manage, control and operate the plan. In addition, each plan must
specify a procedure for establishing and carrying out a funding policy
in line with the requirements of the new law; must provide a procedure
for amending the plan; must set forth a procedure for the allocation
of responsibilities for the operation and administration of the plan;
and must specify the basis on which payments will be made to and
from the plan. In addition, each plan may provide that any person
can serve in more than one fiduciary capacity, that a fiduciary can
employ others to advise him and can appoint an investment manager
to handle any of the plan's assets.
ERISA emphasizes that the assets of the plan must be held exclusively
for the benefit of employee beneficiaries and to defray the reasonable
expenses of administering the plan. A fiduciary is defined as any
person who has any power of control, management or disposition over
the funds or other property of any employee benefit fund. In addition
to being prudent in his actions, a fiduciary may not deal with the
assets of the plan for his own account; act in any capacity in any
transaction involving the plan, on behalf of a party whose interests
are adverse to the plan or its participants; or receive any consideration
from any party in connection with a deal involving fund assets. Except
as permitted by the Secretary of Labor, no fiduciary may maintain
indicia of ownership of any plan assets outside of the jurisdiction
of U.S. District Courts.
Subject to certain exceptions, ERISA specifically spells out certain
activities which are out of bounds for fiduciaries. Most of these prohibited transactions involve a "party in interest". A "party in interest"
is defined as: (a) an administrator, officer, fiduciary, trustee, custodian,
counsel or employee of the plan; (b) a person providing benefit plan
services to the plan; (c) an employer whose employees are covered by
the plan and its employees, officers, directors and 10 percent shareholders; (d) a person controlling, controlled by or under constant
control with, an employer whose employees are covered by the plan;
(e) an officer, employee or agent of the plan's employer or any person
controlling or controlled by the employer and its employees, officers,
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directors and 10 percent shareholders; (f) an employee organization
having members covered by the plan and its employees, officers and
directors and affiliates; (g) a relative, partner or joint venturer of any
of those previously enumerated.
A fiduciary who participates in a prohibited transaction or breaches
any of its responsibilities or duties as fiduciary is personally liable to
the employee benefit fund involved for any losses his act occasioned
and for any profit he realized in the transaction. In addition, such
conduct could result in the removal of the fiduciary by a court.
A fiduciary may not engage in a transaction which constitutes a
direct or indirect sale or exchange between the trust and a party in
interest. An exception to this rule is that acquisition and sale of a
qualifying employer's security between a plan and a party in interest
is okay if on an arms-length basis, for adequate consideration and no
commission is charged.
A fiduciary may not engage in a transaction which constitutes the
direct or indirect leasing of property between the trust and a party
in interest.
A fiduciary may not engage in any transaction which constitutes
the direct or indirect lending of money or extension of credit between
the trust and a party in interest.
In addition, a fiduciary cannot engage in any transaction which constitutes the direct or indirect furnishing of goods, services or facilities
between the trust and a party in interest, or transfer to, or use by or
for the benefit of a party in interest of any of the trust assets, or the
acquisition by the plan of any employer security or employer real
property in excess of that permitted by the new law.
Finally, and most important from the standpoint of ESOPs, a fiduciary who has the authority to manage the assets of a plan cannot
permit the plan to hold an employer's security or employer real property if he knows or should know that such holding is not permitted.
Penalties for fiduciary breach of obligation include non-deductible
excise taxes varying between 5% on the amount involved for each
year or part thereof up to 100% of the amount involved if the prohibited transaction is not corrected within certain time limits; in
addition, there are fines and jail sentences applicable, as well as normal
trustees' legal liability.
How then does the fiduciary responsibility law affect the ESOP itself?
Section 404 of ERISA provides that the fiduciary shall discharge his
duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants
and beneficiaries and: (a) for the exclusive purpose of providing
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries and defraying reasonable
expenses of administration; (b) with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would use in
the conduct of his similar enterprise; (c) by diversifying investments
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so as to minimize the risk ot large losses; (d) in accordance with the
plan's documents insofar as they are consistent with the Act.
While ESOPs are exempted from the diversification requirements
in (c) above and from the prudence requirement of (d) above insofar
as prudence requires diversification, ESOPs are not exempted from the
other requirements of Section 404. The question thus arises as to
whether the ESOP has been established and is operated for the exclusive benefit of the participants and their beneficiaries. This has
great significance where the ESOP is established for some of the
"fancy" financing purposes such as the going public or going private
concepts or raising capital for expansion or permitting a large stockholder to dispose of all or a portion of his shareholdings.
The Internal Revenue Service has long taken the view that the
exclusive benefit rule, which existed prior to ERISA, did not prohibit
other incidental benefits to non-participants. Thus, it would not appear
that the above benefits are per se improper if in fact, the plan is being
run in such manner that the participants receive real benefits therefrom.
If the company establishing the ESOP is a profitable, growing company,
there would not appear to be much of a problem. However, if the company is deficit-ridden or close to bankruptcy, questions as to the
propriety of the ESOP could easily arise.
Another serious situation would arise if the fiduciaries of the ESOP
perceive that the value of the company stock is declining because of its
diminished prospects. Do they have a fiduciary obligation to sell the
stock in order to prevent further losses in market value? On the other
hand, such sales may themselves create a crisis if confidence with respect to the company and thus intensify its problems.
If the fiduciaries of the ESOP are also the directors of the company,
they may have a conflict of interest between their obligations to the
participants of the ESOP and responsibilities to the shareholders of the
company. From my point of view, I would never make a director
a fiduciary of an ESOP.
Questions as to the valuation of the stock of the company are always
critical in the ESOP situation, especially where the shares of the company are not publicly traded. The fiduciary has an affirmative obligation to see that the valuation is proper. Fortunately, the Labor Department recently issued ERISA I B 75-4 in which it interpreted Section
410a of the Act, which prohibits exculpatory provisions in pension
plans, so as not to prohibit an employer from indemnifying the fiduciaries of a plan established by it, or a plan fiduciary from indemnifying its own employees who actually perform the fiduciary services.
This is fine from a federal standpoint but once again, we must look
to the particular state law in which the company operates to see if
it's also fine from the corporate point of view. In New York, a
corporation cannot indemnify a third party, though it may indemnify
its officers, directors and employees as fiduciaries.
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One of the main points raised by people who favor the ESOP is
the utilization of a "friendly" fiduciary so that the fiduciary will
vote the stock under its control in accordance with the wishes of
management, etc. This, in and of itself is a clear violation of fiduciary
responsibility, which is primarily the job of acting as guardian of the
participants' and beneficiaries' rights under the particular plan. It is
well and good to talk about the mutual interest theory between the
fiduciary and management and employees, but in reality the fiduciary
runs a real risk in its actions.
We finally arrive at the ESOP itself and the drafting thereof.
The ESOPs can be prepared under a one or two-document structure.
If you do it as a single document, it is a plan with the trust provisions
built in; in the alternative, you can separate the plan and the trust.
Since ERISA contemplates simplifying the Plan concept so that employees can readily understand it, I recommend using a single document. In Article 1 of the document, known as the Employees Stock
Ownership Plan, there should be an explanation of the nature of the
plan. Thus, it would begin with a purpose statement in Section 1 as
follows:
"The purpose of this Plan is to assist you over the course of your
years of employment with your, employer to accumulate capital
ownership and through that ownership to share in the future of
company and provide you economic security and
income.
The plan is intended to do this without
an independent
any deductions from your paychecks or without calling upon you
to invest your personal savings. A primary purpose of the plan is to
enable you to acquire a proprietary interest in
company and consequently a major portion of the cash payments
made by your employer to the trust for your account will be invested in company stock."
The Plan would then set forth its effective date and go on to explain the way it operates. It would set forth the various definitions that
the plan will operate under, such as "anniversary date," "beneficiary,"
"capital accumulation," "covered compensation," "employee," etc.
Other matters to be discussed include eligibility, participation and the
rules for allocation, whether it be based upon percentage of an employee's compensation to all covered compensation or years of service
and compensation or just years of service. There would also be discussed breaks in service, employer contributions (usually indicating
that the amount of the contributions will be determined by the Board
each year), payment of contributions (usually indicating how contributions shall be paid to the trust), investment of trust assets (usually
indicating that purchases of company stock will be made at a price
or prices which in the judgment of the Committee does not exceed
the fair market value of shares of company stock), allocation to the
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employee's account (usually indicating how it's allocated and when
it's allocated. This includes discussion as to forfeitures and the net income or loss of the trust), who pays the expenses of the plan in trust,
(in most cases the employer will bear that full cost), how voting company stock will be handled (usually indicating that the trustee will
vote all company stock held by it as part of trust assets), the annual
statement which is provided as soon as practicable after each anniversary date to each employee. (Such a statement will indicate the balance
employee's account, any adjustment to the employee's account reflecting share of income or loss of the trust for the year, and the new
balances in each of the employee's accounts, including the number of
shares in the company stock account).
The Plan would also discuss what the employee will receive, the
capital accumulation in general, (the capital accumulation at retirement or death and disability) and at other termination of service setting
forth a vesting scale. (The most recent vesting scale we have used is
30% after three years and 10% a year thereafter until 100% at ten
years.)
The Plan goes on to discuss how the capital accumulation will be
distributed and sets forth certain options which the employee may indicate to the trustee he would like, the final decision being in the
trustee at all times. It is to be remembered that distributions will be
made in employees' stock. The employer has no right to insist on
redemption of stock when the employee retires and receives his distribution. The Plan covers provision for intermediate and partial distributions. This is usually to mitigate financial hardship for employees.
The Plan then goes into the general provisions, such as guarantees,
the future of the plan (indicating that it is subject to initial approval by
the Internal Revenue Service and that it may be amended or terminated
by the company), which law is to govern plan, and the execution of
the plan.
The plan itself is structured in legal, technical language. Sometimes
employees do not really understand this type of language and so I
have always believed in adding a second document to the plan, that
being an employees' stock ownership plan accounting procedures
manual. Under ERISA, employers are required to furnish explanations
of the plan to employees in language that they can understand. Our
accounting procedural manual goes through the explanation of the Plan
in the most simple terms. Some of the troublesome areas are found
in the unallocated company stock accounts, those being accounts before employees are vested; how forfeitures are handled; how net income
or loss of the trust is handled; what happens in respect of stock splits
and capital reorganizations and fractional shares; and, in general, how
the plan operates to the employees' benefit. In some cases it is useful
to provide cartoon-like character drawings to help explain the plan
or put the employees' manual in the form of simple questions and
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answers. The best type of manual may well be a looseleaf structure;
thus, amendments to the plan can be added and annual statements
can be kept together with the plan in the manual by the employees. In
addition, the corporation can even sectionalize the looseleaf book so
that all the employees' benefits can be kept under the same looseleaf
binder. It is to be noted that on many occasions the employees' manual
has been of more help in obtaining stockholder approval than the
plan itself.
As you can see by the above, ESOPs are potentially wonderful benefit programs with all sorts of ancillary implications which are helpful
to almost everybody involved. However, before entering into an ESOP
program, the Board of Directors of the company must be well versed
in federal and state law not only covering the tax implications but
covering all of the other ramifications just discussed.
It becomes obvious that the employees stock ownership plan is
not only an excellent employee benefit program, but may also serve
the purpose of a financing device for a corporation, an estate planner's
tool, and a bail-out device in a closely-held corporation. The key
here is that whatever the program, it must be found to be primarily
for the benefit of employees.

